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Abstract
Without imposing restrictions on the utility function and the
probability distributions, we show the impact of multiple uncer-
tainty (and each single uncertainty) and change in risk aversion
on each input demand. In so doing, we emphasize the importance
of the relationship between the inputs in this impact. Moreover,
the paper provides technical contributions.
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1 Introduction
In the absence of hedging, the vast majority of the studies in uncertainty
considered a single source of uncertainty such as price uncertainty or cost un-
certainty. In contrast, theoretical studies in multiple uncertainty are scarce.
Viaene and Zilcha (1998) considered multiple uncertainty; however they em-
ployed a single-input production function and since, as we will show in this
paper, the decision analysis is sensitive to the relationship between the inputs,
their results are limited. Chambers and Quiggin (2003, 2001) and Dalal and
Alghalith (2009) investigated price and output uncertainty; however, they
did not analyze the input demand. Therefore the relationship between the
inputs was irrelevant to their models. Moreover, they employed restrictive
assumptions. Even with single uncertainty, none of the previous studies,
including Batra and Ullah (1974) and Pope (1980), showed the impact of
uncertainty and change in risk aversion on input demand; and thus they did
not show the role of the relationship between the inputs in this impact.
Other studies relied on the assumption of supermodularity in deriving
comparative statics results. Examples include Athey (2002) and Milgrom
and Shannon (1994), among others. However, these results require the as-
sumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). In addition, they
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mainly dealt with a single source of uncertainty. Similarly, Gollier and Pratt
(1996) relied on the assumption of DARA.
In this paper, using a general framework (no restrictions on the util-
ity functions and probability distributions), we provide comparative statics
under multiple uncertainty. In so doing, we show the impact of multiple un-
certainty (and each single uncertainty) and change in risk aversion on each
input demand. We also show the impact of uncertainty on the optimal inputs
ratio and the input productivity. In doing so, we highlight the importance
of the relationship between the inputs (whether substitutes, complements,
or independent) in this impact. We show that the relationship between the
inputs are important both in production and in utility.
2 The Model
The profit function is given by
p˜i = p˜f (x1,x2)− w˜1x1 − w2x2,
where p˜ is the output price with mean p¯, f is a neoclassical production
function, x1 is the risky input, w˜1 is its price with mean w¯1, x2 is the non-
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risky input with price w2.
1 The risk averse firm maximizes the expected
utility of the profit
Max
x1,x2
Eu (p˜i) ,
where u is a Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The first-order condi-
tions are
(p¯f1 − w¯1)Eu
′ (p˜i∗) + f1Cov (u
′ (p˜i∗) , p˜)− Cov (u′ (p˜i∗) , w˜1) = 0. (1)
(p¯f2 − w2)Eu
′ (p˜i∗) + f2Cov (u
′ (p˜i∗) , p˜) = 0. (2)
The second-order conditions of the maximization problem are
H11 = Eu
′′ (p˜i∗) (p˜f1 − w˜1)
2 + f11Eu
′ (p˜i∗) p˜ < 0.
H22 = Eu
′′ (p˜i∗) (p˜f2 − w2)
2 + f22Eu
′ (p˜i∗) p˜ < 0,
1The results hold if both inputs are risky and/or the output is random (the proofs are
similar); for brevity, we focus on output price uncertainty and one risky input.
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and
|H| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
H11 H12
H12 H22
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0,
where
H12 = Eu
′′ (p˜i∗) (p˜f1 − w˜1) (p˜f2 − w2) + f12Eu
′ (p˜i∗) p˜.
3 The impact of the uncertainty
In this section we will establish the impact of the cost/output price risk
or both risks on the optimal level of each input. That is, we will compare
these values in the presence of both risks to their corresponding values under
certainty, output price uncertainty, and cost uncertainty.
Proposition 1. The introduction of output price and cost uncertainty re-
duces the optimal level of each input if f12 ≥ 0 and p˜ and w˜1 are statistically
independent.
Proof. Let x¯ denote the optimal level of the input under certainty (in
the absence of both risks). From (1)
p¯f1
(
x∗
1,x
∗
2
)
− w¯1 > 0,
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since Cov (u′ (p˜i∗) , p˜) < 0 and Cov (u′ (p˜i∗) , w˜1) > 0.But from the necessary
condition for profit maximization under certainty
p¯f1 (x¯1,x¯2)− w¯1 = 0.
Hence, f1
(
x∗
1,x
∗
2
)
> f1 (x¯1,x¯2) . Similarly, using (2) , we can establish f2
(
x∗
1,x
∗
2
)
>
f2 (x¯1,x¯2). Totally differentiating f1 and f2, we obtain


f11 f12
f12 f22




dx1
dx2

 =


df1
df2

 ,
and thus
dx1 =
f22df1 − f12df2
f11f22 − f 212
.
dx2 =
f11df2 − f12df1
f11f22 − f 212
.
Since df1 > 0 and df2 > 0 in response to the risks, dx1 < 0 and dx2 < 0 if
f12 ≥ 0.
The result is intuitively appealing since the risky input should fall (due
to risk aversion) in response to multiple uncertainty, while the non-risky
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input falls in response to output price uncertainty (this can be easily clari-
fied by a single-input production function). However, the inputs being non-
complements in production (f12 ≥ 0) will guarantee that each input will not
increase when the other input falls in response to the uncertainty. Thus the
change in each input is the net result of two effects: the uncertainty and
the technological relationship between the two inputs (substitutes, comple-
ments, or independent). The two effects will be in the same direction if the
two inputs are substitutes and hence the net effect is a decrease in each input
demand.
It is worth noting that the importance of the relationship between the
inputs was not captured by Viaene and Zilcha’s model since they employed
a single-input production function. Moreover, contrary to the case of out-
put price uncertainty or multiplicative output uncertainty where the optimal
output falls regardless of the technological relationship between the inputs,
we implied that the impact of multiple uncertainty on the optimal output is
indeterminate if f12 < 0.
Proposition 2. The uncertainty reduces the optimal input ratio, x1/x2,
if the production function is homothetic and p˜ and w˜1 are statistically inde-
pendent.
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Proof. With certainty f1/f2 = w1/w2, but with uncertainty f1/f2 =
(w¯1/w2)+Cov (u
′ (p˜i∗) , w˜1) /w2Eu
′ (p˜i∗); thus d ( f1/f2) > 0 when uncertainty
is added. For a homothetic production function, f1/f2 = g (x2/x1) where g is
a monotonic function. Thus d (x1/x2) < 0 in response to the uncertainty.
Proposition 3. The average productivity of the risky input increases in
response to the uncertainty if the production function is homogeneous and p˜
and w˜1 are independent.
Proof. If the production function is homogeneous of degree r, then by
Euler’s Theorem the average productivity of x1 can be written as
f
x1
=
1
r
(
f1 + f2
x2
x1
)
. (3)
We established that the introduction of uncertainty increases f1, f2 and
x2/x1; thus f/x1 increases.
This result is also intuitive since the increase in marginal productivity in-
creases the average productivity. It is worth noting that the previous studies
did not investigate the impact of multiple uncertainty on productivity.
Proposition 4. Starting with cost uncertainty, adding output price un-
certainty reduces the optimal level of each input if f12 ≥ 0 and p˜ and w˜1 are
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statistically independent.
Proof. Rewrite (1) as
Eu′ (p˜i∗) (p¯f1 − w˜1) + f1Cov (u
′ (p˜i∗) , p˜) = 0.
Since Cov (u′ (p˜i∗) , p˜) < 0, the equation above implies that
Eu′ (p˜i∗) (p¯f1 − w˜1) > 0.
Define the sets A and ∼ A such that
A = {w1|p¯f1 − w1 ≥ 0}
∼ A = {w1|p¯f1 − w1 ≤ 0}.
For any w1 ∈ A and w
′
1
∈∼ A,
pf − w1x
∗
1
− w2x
∗
2
≥ pf − w′
1
x∗
1
− w2x
∗
2
; w1 ∈ A, w
′
1
∈∼ A.
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Since u′′ < 0, the inequality above implies
u′ (p˜i∗ (w1)) ≤ u
′ (p˜i∗ (w′
1
)) ; w1 ∈ A, w
′
1
∈∼ A.
Therefore,
S = max
w1∈A
u′ (p˜i∗) ≤ I = min
w1∈∼A
u′ (p˜i∗) .
Thus,
S
u′ (Epp˜i
∗)
≤
I
u′ (Epp˜i
∗)
,
where Ep denotes the expectation with respect to p˜ for a given w1. Since S
and I are both positive, there must exist a positive constant t such that
EpS
u′ (Epp˜i
∗)
≤ t ≤
EpI
u′ (Epp˜i
∗)
,
so that
tu′ (Epp˜i
∗) ≥ EpS ≥ Epu
′ (p˜i∗) , w1 ∈ A, (4)
where the last inequality in (4) holds since S is a maximum. Now (4) implies
(p¯f1 − w1) tu
′ (Epp˜i
∗) ≥ (p¯f1 − w1)Epu
′ (p˜i∗) , w1 ∈ A, (5)
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since p¯f1 − w1 > 0 for w1 ∈ A. Similarly,
(p¯f1 − w1) tu
′ (Epp˜i
∗) ≥ (p¯f1 − w1)Epu
′ (p˜i∗) , w1 ∈∼ A, (6)
since (p¯f1 − w1) < 0 for w1 ∈∼ A. Thus the inequalities in (5) and (6) hold
for all values of w1, and taking expectations with respect to w˜1, we obtain
tEw1 (p¯f1 − w˜1) u
′ (Epp˜i
∗) ≥ E (p¯f1 − w˜1)u
′ (p˜i∗) > 0. (7)
Since t > 0, (7) implies
Ew1 (p¯f1 − w˜1)u
′ (Epp˜i
∗) > 0. (8)
Now, define a1 ≡ Ew1 (p¯f1 − w˜1)u
′ (Epp˜i) and thus da1 > 0 in response to the
introduction of the output price risk. Similarly, define a2 ≡ Ew1 (p¯f2 − w2) u
′ (Epp˜i)
and thus da2 > 0 in response to the output price risk. Totally differentiating
a1 and a2 (holding the parameters constant), we obtain


H¯11 H¯12
H¯12 H¯22




dx1
dx2

 =


da1
da2

 ,
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where H¯ is the Hessian in the absence of the output price risk and H¯12 =
f12p¯Ew1u
′ (Epp˜i); thus
dx1 =
H¯22da1 − H¯12da2
H¯11H¯22 − H¯212
.
dx2 =
H¯11da2 − H¯12da1
H¯11H¯22 − H¯212
.
Therefore dx1 < 0 and dx2 < 0.
It is worth noting that this result is stronger than the standard results
on aversion to one risk in the presence of another (see Pratt (1988)). In
addition, the proof provides technical contributions.
Proposition 5. Given the statistical independence between p˜ and w˜1,
starting with output price uncertainty, adding cost uncertainty (i) reduces
the optimal level of the risky input (ii) reduces the optimal level of the non-
risky input if the inputs are substitutes (in preferences).
Proof. Define b1 ≡ Epu
′ (Ew1p˜i) (p˜f1 − w¯1) and b2 ≡Epu
′ (Ew1 p˜i) (p˜f2 − w2);
we can show db1 > 0 and db2 = 0 in response to the cost uncertainty (the
proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4). Totally differentiating b1 and
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b2 (holding the parameters constant), we obtain


...
H11
...
H12
...
H12
...
H22




dx1
dx2

 =


db1
0

 ,
where
...
H is the Hessian in the absence of cost risk, thus
dx1 =
...
H22db1∣∣...H∣∣ .
dx2 = .
−
...
H12db1∣∣...H∣∣ .
Hence, dx1 < 0; when the inputs are substitutes Eu12 ≡ H12 > 0; thus,
dx2 < 0. Also, dx2 > (=) 0 if the inputs are complements (independent),
since Eu12 < (=) 0.
The result is also intuitive since the risky input must fall in response to
cost uncertainty, whereas the non-risky input reacts according to the pref-
erences relationship between the two inputs. Thus the non-risky input de-
creases (increases) if the inputs are substitutes (complements).
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4 The impact of change in risk aversion
In this section we show the impact of an increase in risk aversion on the
optimal level of each input.
Proposition 6. Given the statistical independence between p˜ and w˜1,
when risk aversion increases the optimal level of each input falls if the inputs
are substitutes or independent.
Proof. For each fixed value of p˜, define wˆ1 by pf1 (x
∗)− wˆ1 = 0 and let
pˆi be the profit when w1 = wˆ1. Also let x
∗ be the optimal input vector for
firm1, respectively. Assume that firm 1 is more risk averse than firm 2. The
first-order condition for firm 1 can be written as
Ew1
u′
1
(p˜i∗)
u′
1
(pˆi)
(pf1 (x
∗)− w˜1) = 0, (9)
where u1 is firm 1’s utility function and u
′
1
(pˆi) is a constant. Equation (9)
can be rewritten as
∫
w˜1<wˆ1
u′
1
(p˜i∗)
u′
1
(pˆi)
(pf1 − w˜1) Γ (w˜1) dw˜1+
∫
w˜1>wˆ1
u′
1
(p˜i∗)
u′
1
(pˆi)
(pf1 − w˜1) Γ (w˜1) dw˜1 = 0,
(10)
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where f1 = f1 (x
∗) . The corresponding expression for firm 2 is
Ew1
[
u′
2
(p˜i∗)
u′
2
(pˆi)
(pf1 − w˜1)
]
=
∫
w˜1<wˆ1
u′
2
(p˜i∗)
u′
2
(pˆi)
(pf1 − w˜1) Γ (w˜1) dw˜1 +
∫
w˜1>wˆ1
u′
2
(p˜i∗)
u′
2
(pˆi)
(pf1 − w˜1) Γ (w˜1) dw˜1.
(11)
Subtracting (10) from (11) yields
∫
w˜1<wˆ1
[
u′
2
(p˜i∗)
u′
2
(pˆi)
−
u′
1
(p˜i∗)
u′
1
(pˆi)
]
(pf1 − w˜1) Γ (w˜1) dw˜1 +∫
w˜1>wˆ1
[
u′
2
(p˜i∗)
u′
2
(pˆi)
−
u′
1
(p˜i∗)
u′
1
(pˆi)
]
(pf1 − w˜1) Γ (w˜1) dw˜1. (12)
An increase in w˜1 decreases p˜i
∗. In the first integral (pf1 (x
∗)− w˜1) is
positive, Pratt showed that the term in square brackets is also positive. These
inequalities are both reversed in the second integral. Consequently (12) is
positive and thus (11) is positive. By the independence assumption,
E
u′
2
(p˜i∗)
u′
2
(pˆi)
(p˜f1 − w˜1) = EpEw1
u′
2
(p˜i∗)
u′
2
(pˆi)
(p˜f1 − w˜1) > 0.
Define α1 ≡ Eu
′
2
(p˜i) (p˜f1 (x)− w˜1); thus dα1 > 0 when risk aversion in-
creases. Similarly, we can show that α2 ≡ Eu
′
2
(p˜i) (p˜f2 (x)− w2) > 0 when
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risk aversion increases. Totally differentiating α1 and α2 (holding the para-
meters constant), we obtain
dα1 = H11dx1 +H12dx2 > 0. (13)
dα2 = H22dx2 +H12dx1 > 0. (14)
From (13) and (14)


H11 H12
H12 H22




dx1
dx2

 =


dα1
dα2

 .
Thus
dx1 =
H22da1 −H12da2
|H|
.
dx2 =
H11da2 −H12da1
|H|
,
and thus dx1 < 0 and dx2 < 0 when risk aversion increases.
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5 Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of the relationship between the inputs
in determining the impact of multiple uncertainty on the input demand.
In the presence of multiple uncertainty, each input demand is less than its
certainty-equivalent level, given the two inputs are substitutes in production.
This is due to two changes. First, the fact that the risky input falls in response
to multiple uncertainty, while the non-risky input falls in response to output
price uncertainty. Second, the inputs being substitutes causes each input to
decrease when the other input falls due to uncertainty. The two changes will
be in the same direction if the two inputs are substitutes and hence the net
effect is a decrease in each input demand. Consequently, in the presence of
multiple uncertainty, each input demand is less than the input demand in
the presence of only cost uncertainty, given the two inputs are substitutes
in production/preferences. Also, in the presence of multiple uncertainty, the
demand for each input is less than its level in the presence of only output
price uncertainty, given the inputs are substitutes in preferences. Moreover,
when risk aversion increases, both inputs fall if the inputs are substitutes in
preferences.
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